North Korea Heading Down the Rabbit Hole

The inflamed rhetoric heading out of North Korea continued today with the launch of six missiles over the last 24 hours (both medium and short-range). Additionally, it appears the North Korea has restarted a previously closed nuclear plant, and has begun reprocessing of spent fuel rods. As was reported here, Kim Jong Il's moves to conduct an underground nuclear test over the weekend and frequent missile tests may have several causes, but the reasons behind his actions may prove irrelevant if he continues in this line. To date, it appears that he is using these tests to both strengthen his hand at home (and any successors) while thumbing his nose at Seoul and D.C.

It now seems increasingly clear that North Korea is already proliferating: 'U.S. security studies have identified North Korea as a supplier of missiles and nuclear materials to nations including Syria and Pakistan in exchange for cash.' Of perhaps the greatest concern, are the growing ties between North Korea and Iran. 'North Korea is helping Iran to prepare an underground nuclear test similar to the one Pyongyang carried out last year. Under the terms of a new understanding between the two countries, the North Koreans have agreed to share all the data and information they received from their successful test last October with Teheran's nuclear scientists.' If true, then President Obama won't have his year to see how well Tehran and Pyongyang are going to respond to his overtures. The Telegraph article cited in the previous line continues: 'A senior European defence official told The Daily Telegraph that North Korea had invited a team of Iranian nuclear scientists to study the results of last October's underground test to assist Teheran's preparations to conduct its own — possibly by the end of this year. There were unconfirmed reports at the time of the Korean firing that an Iranian team was present. Iranian military advisers regularly visit North Korea to participate in missile tests. Now the long-standing military co-operation between the countries has been extended to nuclear issues.'

In a 2004 report, Ted Carpenter (VP Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute) laid out the pros and cons of four options for responding to North Korea: bribery (again), preemptive war, tightened economic sanctions, and regional nuclear balance. Certainly, none of the options are all together palatable, and we've been using the first and third options to some degree or another for the last twenty years. There has been talk lately of employing the fourth option (that is, to give Japan, South Korea and Taiwan support in developing their own nuclear programs). Such an option takes time to develop of course, and in the case of Japan, there would be extensive cultural resistance and the need to change its constitution. China would probably vigorously oppose such a solution, no matter how pure its intent. Carpenter concludes that the US should pull its troops out of SE Asia, and allow events to take their own course (but this was before our involvement in Central Asia).

The United Nations, and activists in Japan and South Korea, have advocated a regional 'nuclear-free' zone (who wouldn't?), but this is pie-in-the-sky thinking. It's not a nuclear-free zone, and neither China nor North Korea is going to suddenly give up its weapons. China's program is well-advanced and could serve as a counter-weight to North Korea, but it's difficult to know which direction China's policy toward Pyongyang is going to go. There are extensive ties between the two nations, and China is generally sympathetic toward 'non-interference' policies (since they want no one to poke around their internal policies). On the other hand, China probably doesn't want a nuclear North Korea under the direction of an unstable Kim Jong Il.

In the end, we would have difficulty protecting our allies and assets in the region if we were to either directly engage in a preemptive strike or if we supported one. We also have a military stretched to its limits, and engagement in a third extensive engagement might very well break it. Further regional proliferation would be a long-term proposal, and is fraught with problems, and bribery has repeatedly failed. We may be stuck with containment and trying to wait for Jong Il to die. If we take the 'wait 'em out' approach, we're also going to need to ensure that we have hard blockade to further proliferation (along with the willingness to defend that blockade), and that we beef up the defense capabilities of our allies, and we need to deal with Iran now, rather than waiting a year. Without those secondary actions, we're going to end up in this position again.

UPDATES: Oooh, Aahhh - Worldwide Condemnation for North Korea

UPDATE 2: Kim Jong Il apparently feels the need to announce his size by launching yet more missiles. One wonders if the only option here is to contain N. Korea, and prevent the sale of arms and weapons, and yet reports have Iran there already in observer status.

UPDATE 1: The President has announced that we will '... work with our allies to stand up to North Korea.' Isn't it great that we're now relying on others to know when, how and why to stand up?

As reported here the other day, North Korea conducted a successful underground nuclear test two days ago, and overnight (EST), the nation launched two missile tests. From the Guardian: 'A defiant North Korea fired two short-range missiles off its east coast today, according to news reports, hours after the UN security council condemned the apparently successful test of a nuclear weapon as powerful as the one that destroyed Hiroshima.' Apparently, and as predicted, North Korea really doesn't care what the US and UN have to say. That's nothing new. North Korea launches a test, we complain to the UN Security Council, the council makes noises, nothing happens. The US and the UN are fairly impotent when it comes to reigning in 'rogue nations,' as witnessed by last week's repeat missile test by Iran.

Of perhaps greater interest is the speculation surrounding why both nations seem to be pushing hard to conduct tests. Of course, it hardly matters when and why when you don't care what the neighbors think, but the potential reasoning in the case of Iran and North Korea may be more relevant than normally. In an article from yesterday, the Guardian raises three likely scenarios for North Korea. 1. Tensions over the possible succession to Kim Jong-Il. 'Signs of internal tensions have continued to grow despite Kim's political resurrection, including a cabinet reshuffle in which about one-third of ministers lost their jobs or were reassigned. A similar shake-up is said to have taken place among the highest ranks of the military.' 2. The normal paranoia under which North Korea operates. 'Jim Hoare, a former British ambassador to North Korea, said a second explanation should be considered: that North Korea was reacting to what it perceived to be threatening and destabilising external events, notably the ending of South Korea's "sunshine policy" that had encouraged deeper engagement.' 3. North Korea is descending into chaos, a situation that the Guardian understates as the 'least palatable' of the three options. '... the possibility that, increasingly, nobody is really in charge in Pyongyang and that the country is beginning literally to run out of control. If North Korea suddenly imploded, the US and South Korea might come in from one side and China from the other, Foster-Carter warned. The danger of history repeating itself was, he said, a "baleful prospect".'

Of course, calls for general 'military action' against North Korea are unrealistic and wildly optimistic, but it's difficult to see what other action might be successful. Clearly shaking our fist doesn't work. It might be helpful if China and Russia would fully cooperate with the US and Japan, presenting a unified face to both North Korea and Japan. It's possible that cutting off access to international funding and complete isolation may eventually bring pressure to bear on the nation. There are three problems with this second option: 1. North Korea may very well lash out in a way we are unprepared to deal with; 2. complete international compliance with such a strategy is impossible to achieve; 3. we'd have to stomach watching North Korea allow its own citizens to starve and suffer. A targeted military response designed to take out missiles and nuclear facilities may be the most feasible option, but of course, it would have to be completely accurate and successful to make it worthwhile. It's unlikely that either the President or Congress have the will to command such a strike, and its unclear if we're capable of it. It's even less likely that the UN would help with logistical support or personnel, leaving the US on its own to conduct such an operation.

Beyond the question of North Korea, Iran may be sharing information with North Korea and is likely to be watching the US and UN response to see how far we're willing to go. More particularly, both nations may be testing President Obama, and perceiving weakness in his determination to operate from international consensus. Additionally, Iran's most recent missile tests, along with its attempts to shut down access to electronic communication (email, social networking sites, etc.) in the lead up to the presidential election, may be more about internal communication. By all accounts, Ahmadinejad is deeply unpopular, having steered Iran's economy into a ditch, but there is also disorganization among the clerics that run the Revolutionary Guards. Ahmadinejad may be trying to win the election by benefiting from appearing strong and by capitalizing on the lack of a clear opposition candidate. A reformist is running, but there has been no clear signal that the Supreme Leader will back him. Ahmadinejad is a canny politician, willing to use a combination of bullying and bribery to win votes and temporary support, and without strong and clear opposition, he may very well win the election in June.

Whatever the reasons behind the actions of both North Korea and Iran, and they are probably multi-faceted, it seems clear the President Obama is going to need to do better than to pledge to 'work with our friends and allies.' Between his deep reluctance to take forceful and unilateral action, and the UN's perpetual unwillingness to take action of any kind, the next year may push the US into the same corner it experienced under President Carter.

UPDATE: Washington Will Do Something (or other)!

Update 1: How much do you want to bet that North Korea actually means its threat to take 'strong action' should the UN dare to sanction it.

As predicted here and elsewhere, when N. Korea fired off an ICBM test disguised as a satellite launch over the weekend, we and Japan demanded that the UN security conference do something. Just as predictably, China and Russia flipped us the bird. It really doesn't even matter if this launch was an actual failure, if there really was a satellite in the nose cone, or if Kim Jong Il had succeeded in playing revolutionary songs from space. The UN will do nothing, and the words of these agreements mean nothing without action to back them up. President Obama can give 'strong' speeches all he wants - it changes nothing. If our only response to proliferation is to say that we need to cut our weapons (a laudable goal to be sure, but irrelevant to N. Korea), and that we won't really do anything, than N. Korea has no incentives to change its behavior.